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An alternative conjecture to the never ending wars puzzle is introduced here. It is argued 
that the way in which information flows through the social structure of war determines its 
duration. The key point is that irregular war changes the underlying social network 
structure and the way information flows through it, blocking informational cascades about 
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Introduction 
 
Wars create order through destruction and 
chaos. The uncertain expectations of 
warring factions, their political plans, 
their designs for probable futures become 
- with time and death - definite structures, 
stable results, new forms of domination 
and hegemony for the victorious side, and 
the eventual disappearance of the 
defeated ones. But war - both irregular 
and conventional - being a human 
phenomenon, fully dependent on the 
actions and conjectures of human beings 
organized according to different social 
arrangements, requires information to 
generate order out of chaos and 
destruction. Defeat, for instance, can only 
be accepted over the basis of knowing 
that there is no better course of action 
than to admit the impossibility of keeping 
offensive or defensive actions under the 
current circumstances. Direct experience 
does not sensibly improve the situation: 
soldiers, civilians, military leaders, 
observers, strategists cannot always 
know, from action and real fighting, the 
global effects of what they are doing or 
have done in the near past. In chapter V 
of Sthendal's classic novel, The 
Charterhouse of Parma, Fabrice, who 
badly wanted to fight on the side of his 
much admired Emperor, manages to fall 
in the middle of one of the Emperor's 
regiments during the battle of Waterloo, 
rides along mythical Marshall Ney's 
escort and even kills an enemy's soldier, 
but two weeks later, after recovering from 
his wounds, he still did not know if in fact 
he had been in the battle of Waterloo. He 
muses:  
 
“What he has seen, had it really been a 
battle at all? Was that in fact the battle of 
Waterloo?” (Stendhal 1973, 92-3). 
Although Fabrice had been in the 
battleground, risking his life, and learning 
from direct experience what war was all 
about, he was not sure if what he had 
watched and lived was really a battle, and 
if that was indeed the famous and 
decisive battle of Waterloo. Granted that 
Fabrice could not have full information 
about the global result of the battle, 
granted too that he was only a very 
excitable, dash and emotional young man 
trying to see, through his own eyes, the 
destiny of Europe in the admired figure of 
the Emperor, but his predicament was a 
real one, shared not only by civilians and 
casual observers, but also by the very 
experts and military leaders involved in 
the real confrontation---even by the 
Emperor himself. Fabrice did not know if 
all the events he had lived were part of a 
real battle and if that battle was Waterloo. 
Had he been asked if he had fought at 
Waterloo he could have not answered 
with “yes” or a “no”, for he was uncertain 
about a seemingly simple fact: Was the 
chain of events he had been involved in 
part of the famous battle? The Emperor 
himself in the morning preceding the 
battle was sure of his army's superiority 
and of the clear inferiority of British 
soldiers. Experts writing from the vantage 
point of the future contend that had the 
Emperor's army regrouped and attacked 
some hours earlier the result of the battle 
would have been the one predicted by the 
Emperor in the dim hours of that 
morning. The main question remains the 
same: Do we know now better than 
Fabrice?. 
 
I am afraid we are in an even more 
helpless situation than Fabrice himself. 
For in Sthendal’s times wars were fought 
in large and crucial battles, with both 
sides' best men and weaponry facing each 
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other in a momentous duel. One, two or 
three days of intense killing would define 
the outcome and its consequences would 
pass along the political and geographical 
space until new territorial and political 
arrangements emerged. There is no such 
thing as a decisive battle in contemporary 
warfare: hundreds, thousands of small 
battles, combats and skirmishes have 
replaced it, making the broadcasting of its 
results a difficult and uncertain process 
and giving the political, media and 
negotiation spheres a headway it never 
enjoyed in a non -- too -- distant past. If 
there is no decisive battles anymore, and 
if the outcomes of war do not pass along 
in the smooth, hierarchical way they used 
to pass in the glorious times of Napoleon, 
Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Bolívar 
and their like, how do contemporary wars 
manage to diminish uncertainty and thus 
create order out of destruction and chaos?  
 
War and uncertainty 
 
Though uncertain in nature, war has been 
traditionally thought as a costly and 
complex process aiming at diminishing 
uncertainty. One of the greatest paradoxes 
of war lied there: it was capable of 
reducing uncertainty through the 
production of uncertainty, achieving new 
states of order over the ashes of old 
regimes. But not all wars were equally 
effective at doing it. Huge, interstate 
wars, with hierarchical flows of 
information, and clearly defined friends 
and enemies, were pretty effective in 
reducing uncertainty at the highest of 
prices: total devastation of entire 
countries and millions of deaths and 
casualties. War World II is the epitome of 
this type of war. In the tradition started by 
the Greeks (Keegan, ) all warring states 
fought almost until its last man. Every 
participant was willing to take as many 
deaths and casualties as victory would 
require. The sixty million people killed 
stood as a sad confirmation of how 
seriously war to death was taken. 
Irregular, civil wars are not as effective in 
achieving results in short periods of time. 
They may become endless and painfully 
long. Uncertainty is preserved along the 
process creating the informational 
conditions for long duration, almost never 
ending wars.  
 
There is indeed no shortage of 
explanations for the emergence of endless 
wars. But, to my knowledge, there is no 
general explanation for the duration of 
any type of war. This essay is an attempt 
to introduce an alternative explanation for 
the duration of wars from the vantage 
point of how information is broadcasted, 
exchanged and channeled in warring 
contexts. In those wars in which 
information flows from the top to the 
bottom, and there is no uncertainty 
concerning friend and foe, civilians' 
behavior, and geographical heterogeneity 
is overcome by the scale of the war effort, 
uncertainty may be effectively reduced to 
the point of reaching an end to the war in 
a limited number of years. Now picture 
the opposite situation: civilians keep 
changing alliances and switching sides, 
information does not stop flowing in a 
decentralized way from many sources, 
and geographical heterogeneity dominates 
the war effort. As the underlying 
informational structure keeps all sources 
of uncertainty active, war does not come 
to an end.  
 
An informational theory of the duration of 
war must cover both situations and all the 
events in between. How to relate the 
duration of wars and its informational 
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structure is the main question this paper 
attempts to address. Here it is the basic 
intuition. Imagine war as a mechanism to 
reduce the uncertainty concerning its final 
outcome. As those who initiate or trigger 
war do not know the final outcome of 
their actions, they played the highest of 
all stakes hoping for the best without 
knowing for sure what is going to be the 
net result of their efforts and plans. Even 
the most lopsided of wars, the one with 
the highest gap in troops, military might, 
morale and technology, does not come to 
this world with a sure thing result 
attached to it. Consider the ongoing US 
war against terrorism in Iraq. The first 
phase was easily won due to the sheer 
superiority of the American troops and 
technology, and the political decay of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime. But the 
subsequent phases have proved more 
difficult to assess in terms of the 
proximity of its likely end. The US army, 
and its indecisive allies, cannot tell friend 
from foe, civilians (in their many tribes 
and political leanings) keep changing 
coalitions and alliances, information 
flows from everywhere in a contradictory, 
sometimes mutually canceling way: the 
outcome of war is anything but near or 
clear.  
 
Consider Joe Klein's (2007) Time piece 
on General David Petraeus’ new strategy 
to secure at least an honorable exit from 
Iraq. Klein tells us how exhilarated 
General Petraeus was about the 
incorporation of 500 new recruits for the 
Iraqi police force. Petraeus' exhilaration 
had a promising strategic foundation: all 
of them were recruited with the help of 
local sheiks of Sunni lineage, and linked 
in the recent past to the Sunni anti-
American insurgency. But the Iraqi 
police’ bent for corruption, duplicity and 
collaboration with the militias made 
Petraeus’ strategy dubious to say the 
least. The General’s solution to the 
duplicity predicament is a telling instance 
of how to fight informational wars: all the 
new recruits have got retinal scans and 
have been fingerprinted. That way any 
treacherous action from them would be 
detected and the culprit readily identified. 
In an informational tone Petraeus states 
the long run implications of his biometric 
mechanism:  
 
“We're beginning to build a fairly significant 
database”.(Klein, 16)  
 
All this is of course paradoxical in its 
very nature. As Luttwak (2000) has 
eloquently insisted that understanding war 
requires a paradoxical, non-linear logic. 
My contention is that the paradoxical 
character of war strategy also applies to 
the relationships between information and 
war duration. A first difficulty in building 
up a general theory of the duration war 
from an informational point of view is 
that there is no a unique underlying 
process producing all wars. Each war is 
an independent phenomenon with its own 
particular conditions and history. 
However, what it is doable is to associate 
to every war an informational structure as 
general and flexible as it could possibly 
be. Then a mapping taking informational 
structures and sending them on to the set 
of all wars’ duration will establish a 
relationship between the informational 
structure of every war and its specific 
time duration.  
 
Let us construct a spectrum of wars 
according to its informational structure. In 
one extreme one can find regular, 
classical wars, in the other extreme 
irregular wars. Between them, in different 
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degrees of informational transparency, all 
wars would order themselves. Three main 
criteria will be used to situate each war on 
a specific point of the spectrum.  
 
The first criterion is the uncertainty, or 
certainty, concerning friend and enemy. 
In wars between national-states or 
coalitions of them, friend and enemy are 
clearly discernible, and the uncertainty 
associated with them is almost nil or nil. 
In irregular and civil wars is very difficult 
to tell friend from foe. Moreover, this is 
what irregular wars all are about: 
knowing who is your friend and who is 
your enemy is knowing what to do and 
how likely your victory or your defeat is. 
Parties to an irregular war walk over this 
high rope all the time. That is why 
information is at the center of stage in 
irregular wars.  
 
The second criterion is how hierarchical 
is the flow of information in both sides of 
the war. When information flows from 
the top to the bottom and civilian 
population at large accepts the orders 
given at the top one can attach a very 
small uncertainty to this variable. Nazi 
Germany, during World War Two, is a 
good example of a national state involved 
in a total war, with a strong hierarchical 
structure, in which the word of the Führer 
was followed by the whole nation. 
Dissidents were punished with death, 
since they were considered as traitors to 
the national effort. Of course some 
information would flow through 
independent channels to the highest risk 
of the individuals involved. The recent 
movie Sophie Scholl is a good example of 
how costly was to deviate from this 
hierarchical line of information: the 
youths involved in the innocent writing 
and distribution of pamphlets against the 
doomed German war effort in the eastern 
front were arrested, prosecuted and 
readily executed in three days. Note that 
information has a very special meaning in 
this context: it strictly means that the 
state---and first and foremost its armed 
forces---is the only legal and legitimate 
source of information concerning the state 
of the war, the enemy's capabilities, and 
the most probable outcome of war. All 
other sources of information are 
considered as potential venues of treason 
and confusion and are punished with 
execution. Under this criterion we can 
include how unified is the command of 
the parties at war, and the scale of the 
resources in their hands. Although some 
irregular wars may have parties with 
unified commands and huge resources to 
be thrown into the war effort, they still 
are irregular wars from the vantage point 
of civilians' key role in them.  
 
Consider the Soviet Union's performance 
in World War II. The destruction of social 
networks achieved by Stalin's regime has 
created a full hierarchical society with 
Stalin himself at the top of the hierarchy 
enjoying a virtual monopoly of the whole 
war operation against the Nazi invasion, 
and having total control over the life and 
death of his own fellow country men. The 
horrible carnage, the massive killing, the 
destruction of millions of lives in a ill 
conducted war were only possible 
because the only information soldiers, 
families and prospective soldiers have 
was the one produced at the top of the 
state and the communist party. In Ivan's 
Army. Life and death in the Red Army is 
superbly established how only this 
hierarchical information structure and the 
destruction of social networks allowed for 
the heroic, almost suicidal actions of the 
Soviet people during WWII. Had they 
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known the reality of the destruction and 
killing at the beginning of the Nazi 
offensive in 1941 the solid front the 
Soviet people made and their will to fight 
would have crumbled.  
 
A third criterion is how deep and 
uncertain is the role of the civilian 
population. Civilians are crucial to 
irregular wars and they can change 
allegiances, break down old coalitions, 
switch sides and inform on their current 
allies. Civilians are a permanent and 
strong source of uncertainty. As a matter 
of fact, the strongest dividing line is the 
one separating wars depending crucially 
on the civilians' actions and strategies, 
and those in which civilians are an 
obedient party to the hierarchically 
organized war effort.  
 
Information is action and there is no 
action without information. By the same 
token the expected consequences of 
actions have an effect over decisions 
concerning the transfer of information. If 
transferring information changes an 
individual's position with respect to his 
survival and increases his own payoff, 
information will be transferred. On the 
contrary, if transferring information 
diminishes the expected payoff, in terms 
of survival and potential economic gains, 
the transfer of information will not ocurr. 
It is easy to infer that these relationships 
generate an unexpected causality's 
direction: causality will run from the 
expected consequences of the actions that 
will follow after the exchange of 
information to the decision concerning 
the transfer of information. And the ways 
in which information is exchanged, 
retained or revealed determine the 
occurrence, and the reach and strength, of 
actions. At the same time, action is 
information. For is there a more effective 
way to convey information than real, 
observable actions? This essay is 
precisely about how action and its 
outcomes are transformed, through 
information, within the context of 
contemporary irregular wars.  
 
I want to develop here the consequences 
of the following conjecture for the study 
of irregular wars - and even of 
conventional ones: the outbreak, 
development and duration of irregular 
wars are informational problems. How 
potential rivals perceive each other, how 
they “create” each other - through 
conjectures, mistakes and 
misrepresentations- as enemy or friend, or 
how they cannot tell for sure friend from 
foe, how much they know about the real 
capabilities and strength of each other, 
how they perceive the potential threat 
they represent to each other, how they 
choose to magnify or reduce the threat 
embodied in a potential rival are all valid 
informational questions whose answers 
are helpful in addressing classical 
questions about war: when it starts and 
why, how it develops and for how long 
and why and how it endures in time. How 
much this approach will add to the 
already available knowledge about war 
can only be known in trying it. What kind 
of predictions would yield this type of 
theory? Would it predict, for instance, the 
outbreak of war, given the basic 
information concerning perceptions, 
threats, strength and conjectures? Or 
would it predict in advance the long, 
medium or short duration of war? As 
information is changing in time answers 
must be negative.  
 
I will concentrate in the long duration part 
of my conjecture. Here is the specific 
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conjecture for never ending irregular 
wars: wars in which information stays in 
a state of flux, in a middle point between 
full disorder and order, are prone to 
become never ending or to last for longer 
than armed conflicts with different 
information structures. Before defining 
states of information, order and disorder, I 
will justify the role of information in the 
outbreak, development and ending of 
wars. Consider the following basic 
questions about irregular wars: Who is 
perceived as a threat? To whom? Grouped 
with whom? With which strength? Who 
should I group with in order to survive? 
And, most difficult of all, who is the 
knowing agent in all these processes? 
Who is the one who knows--the 
individual agent, the organization, or the 
social networks, social groups, political 
parties, and nations to which individuals 
belong? Now consider the same questions 
at different levels of social complexity, 
starting at the neighborhood level and 
going up the ladder through villages, 
hamlets, regions, until arriving to the 
global level.  
 
Note the increasing complexity involved 
and the insurmountable difficulty to any 
human being, no matter how well 
informed and how brilliant and powerful, 
to understanding and knowing the global 
state of the war process. The interesting 
thing is that at every one of those levels 
individuals, organizations, parties, 
guerrillas, state forces are capable of 
taking decisions using the information 
available at each one of them. But nobody 
of course knows the global result and 
nobody takes the decisions at hand 
knowing the full state of the war. In a way 
all of them act under some state of 
myopia: they take decisions of life and 
death on a local level without knowing 
what is the global state of the war. Even 
military and political leaders must take 
decisions under the spell of some basic 
myopia. My hunch is that the key to this 
elusive aggregation process is 
information. What flows through rumors, 
conversations and actions is information 
contributing to the making of myriads of 
new decisions all over the space of war---
both local and global. Differences as to 
how, by what ways, with what speed, 
information travels through agents must 
have an impact on the global result of war 
and on its duration. In all cases the speed 
at which information is transferred 
through the social structure, if in fact it is 
at all, depends on the specific pattern of 
social relations: how people are related to 
each other, how densely, through which 
paths, according to what type of social 
organization - hierarchical or horizontal - 
living in Asimov’s Solaria or in the 
Caveman’s world Watts (1999). As 
irregular wars destroy social structures, 
break social networks down, and decrease 
in general the social connectedness of the 
enemy, information will not be 
transferred with the speed and strength 
required to have a definite outcome, 
generating never ending conflicts. This of 
course announces the main 
methodological setting I will be working 
in here: the analysis of war as an 
informational problem within a context of 
social and complex networks.  
 
In a nutshell: in irregular wars social 
structure is endogenous to the war 
process. The implication is key to 
understand the main claim of this essay: if 
social structures do not remain stable 
during war, the flow of information 
concerning war's outcome will be 
dependent on the same changing social 
structure, and so it will be its very final 
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outcome. Thus predictions about war's 
outcomes will hinge around the direction 
of change on social structures. For the 
moment I can introduce two main types 
of final structures. The first one covers 
those wars in which the number of 
components increases and disconnection 
becomes a structural phenomenon. The 
second one reflects a successful process 
of adding or aggregating nodes to a main 
network leading to a definite outcome. 
The first type of structure implies a highly 
fragmented and divided territory with 
geography keeping events local and 
universal coalitions remaining a very 
improbable and distant event.  
 
Wars that rapidly and effectively 
aggregate decisions through information 
until creating states closer to order are 
short and decisive, with a clear victor and 
a clear loser, and no ambiguity 
whatsoever about who is who. This type 
of war requires unified command, huge 
resources, unified national states or strong 
military and political alliances. Enemy 
and friend are clearly defined and national 
states, or coalitions of them, are the main 
warring agents. Information ideally flows 
from the top to the bottom of military and 
political hierarchies, and national or 
international leaders mobilize millions of 
people in their efforts to prevail in war. 
The control of civilian population is not 
an issue here and those who dare to 
disagree with the war effort are swiftly 
proclaimed as traitors and summarily 
executed. This type of conventional, 
hierarchical, and national state wars tend 
to have shorter lifes as decisive outcomes 
are reached through sheer military 
superiority and information cascades.2  
                                                 
                                                                    
2 Fujimori's government crackdown on Shinning 
Path guerrilla is in the middle of the extremes 
 
Irregular wars do not fit that pattern. As 
the control of civilian population is a 
central goal in civil and irregular wars, 
local interactions, individual decisions 
and its grouping through social networks 
are crucial to understand its dynamics. 
The switching of sides by civilians and 
military men, the emergence of changing 
alliances between armed agents and 
civilians, the reversal or destruction of 
working regional or local alliances, the 
constant shifting in local control 
contribute to a state of permanent flux, in 
which is very improbable that a pattern of 
order, that is, a pattern of victory and 
defeat emerges. If this is joined by 
multiple business interests and venues, 
and by the growing number of economic 
agents connected to the war effort within 
a global context, the picture becomes 
even more blurred and less decisive 3 . 
 
introduced here. The Peruvian state effectively 
defeated Shinning Path and created a huge 
victorious coalition. It was not a war between 
states, but enemy and friend were clearly defined. 
 
3 The meshing of business and war has developed 
at a remarkable speed, creating diverse ways and 
paths to accommodate business interests within 
irregular war contexts. Multinational corporations 
exploiting natural resources have managed to 
achieve more or less permanent and working 
agreements with rebel and irregular forces, on one 
side, and with paramilitary and state forces, on the 
other. All those exchanges involve money 
changing hands and contributing to the financing 
of irregular and state forces. This has been 
happening in Africa, Latin America and Asia. As 
national states are weaker in Africa oil and 
diamonds companies have relied more heavily in 
secret and not-so-secret agreements with rebels, 
warlords and irregular forces. Specialists in 
intermediation are in charge of the relationships 
between multinational corporations and irregular 
forces. They know the required information and 
contract out their services to both sides. All this of 
course contributes to the long duration of war. 
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War is not capable of producing enough 
destruction so as to yield a clear victor or 
to lead all parties to recognize their 
impotence to achieve working victorious 
alliances. Or, in an even worse turn of 
events, destruction can achieve high 
levels without diminishing the basic 
ambiguity with respect to the global 
outcome of war.  
 
Information and Netwars 
 
Contemporary irregular wars have 
undergone an additional major 
transformation. The specific network 
structure of a terrorist organization or of a 
state secret organization has become a 
strategy within the set of strategies of 
warring parties. How are its members 
related to each other, how sparse their 
relations should be, and how crucial is the 
existence of a key player are questions 
that strategists have to answer in order to 
improve the lethal power of the war 
structures they are conducting. This 
transformation is informational in its 
essence. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2002), for 
instance, linked the advent of what they 
labeled as Netwar to the information 
revolution and the way in which it has 
favored and strengthen networks forms of 
organization over the traditional 
hierarchical forms used by armies all over 
the world. Let themselves make the case 
for the major transformations introduced 
in warfare by the advent of Netwar:  
 
“Major transformations are thus coming 
in the nature of adversaries, in the type of 
threats they may pose, and in how 
conflicts can be waged. Information-age 
threats are likely to be more diffuse, 
dispersed, multidimensional nonlinear, 
                                                                     
 
and ambiguous than industrial-age 
threats. Metaphorically, then, future 
conflicts may resemble the Oriental game 
of Go more than the Western game of 
chess. The conflict spectrum will be 
remolded from end to end by these 
dynamics” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt Op. Cit.,  2).  
 
Two of the major points made by Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt deserve more elaboration. 
The first one is the nature of adversaries. 
Whereas in conventional wars there was 
no doubt about who the enemy was, in 
irregular wars, and particularly in 
netwars, it is not clear who the enemy is. 
A current ally can become an enemy in a 
very short notice. Or former enemies can 
become active allies against a newly 
found common enemy. The classical 
division between friend and enemy, at the 
heart of Carl Schmitt's theory of war and 
politics, becomes blurred and diffuse. If 
you do not know who your enemy is, you 
are uncertain with respect to what is to be 
done. The clear-cut connection between 
information and action suddenly breaks 
down: if nobody knows for sure who his 
enemy is, his actions can become 
uninformed, imprecise and even 
downright irrational. States, warlords and 
rebels must thus face a classical 
informational puzzle for which they were 
not prepared: with limited information 
they are forced to "pick" their own 
enemies, and in doing so they may create 
new enemies. A very recent example can 
be found in the actions of President 
George W. Bush with respect to 
Afghanistan, Irak and the so-called war 
on terror. As US’ enemies did not have a 
defined and precise face, he had to pick 
who was the real enemy giving him a 
name, a story and a face. He picked two: 
Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. 
Although defeating the second proved to 
 9
DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 
be an easy target, the consolidation of 
victory became a classical nightmare. US’ 
enemies multiply inside Irak and what 
was supposed to be a short and clean war, 
defined by technology and sheer military 
power, became a dirty, blurred and 
unfinishable one, with multiple enemies 
and rapidly changing alliances.  
 
The second main transformation is related 
to the character and strength of potential 
enemies' threats. In irregular wars the 
type and extension of enemies' threats 
become uncertain. An uncertain threat is 
the most effective of all threats for 
uncertainty raise the threat to a positive 
power, depending on the enemy's military 
capabilities, imagination, and sheer lack 
of knowledge about their purposes and 
values. The exponential growth of a 
threat's magnitude is related to fear, loss 
of well being and the general perception 
of insecurity inflicted on the potentially 
threatened party. Is there a more 
dangerous threat that the most uncertain 
of them all? I guess not, and this links 
irregular war and information in a crucial 
way: as threats are an informational issue 
too, national states must learn how to 
evaluate and deal with diffuse threats. 
The informational complexity of the task 
at hand grows in an exponential way and 
calls for new strategies like the creation 
of social networks and the infiltration of 
already existing ones. But by doing so 
enemies and friends have to look and act 
alike. Networks meshed and the methods 
and actions at hand tend to converge. The 
most important implication of all this is 
the higher complexity costs involved in 
choosing strategic actions for any warring 
agent. Central state agencies, no matter 
how technically endowed and trained, 
cannot extract, process and transform into 
actions all the required information. As 
the complexity costs involved in this type 
of exercise are clearly insurmountable, 
decision making and war outcomes must 
become spontaneous. It is the aggregation 
of multiple, local informational decisions 
what finally will lead to a definite 





The conjecture I have been trying to 
introduce here must compete with a 
number of alternative hypothesis or 
theories. I guess that most of them are 
non-informational in character and 
method, though they inevitably merge in 
some local points with the above 
conjecture. My hunch is that a good 
informational theory of war must deal 
with three connected issues. First, it must 
deal with the emergence of contentious 
parties, and of their perceptions, 
conjectures and threats. Second, it must 
address the social structure capable of 
broadcasting or blocking those 
perceptions. And third it must deal with 
the informational structure that allows for 
longer or shorter wars.  
 
James Fearon's theory fearon is a case in 
point. His theory revolves around a 
crucial point: if the duration of war 
depends on the guerrillas' survival, a good 
theory of war should address on what that 
survival depends. Fearon contends that 
their survival depends on “their 
controlling the information about who 
and where they are” (Fearon 2005, 1). 
This, of course, is informational both in 
content and in perspective. He chose to 
use a game theoretical model with a 
contest success function to find 
equilibrium results for a contest between 
a central state and guerrilla forces. Given 
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the very well known limitations of contest 
success functions Fearon decided to open 
its structure up. He obtained a low level 
equilibrium that ensured both a long 
duration war and the unfeasibility of 
negotiated arrangements. But his 
theoretical choice prevented him from 
treating information in an explicit way. 
The author recognizes this fact at the end 
of this paper for he commits himself to  
 
“(…) go further in this direction, developing 
a more explicit model of the information 
contest between rebels and government in 
this case of guerrilla war.” (Fearon 2005, 27)  
 
Though I am sympathetic to the intuition 
of Fearon's theory I differ from his 
approach in dealing with the information 
issue in state-guerrilla wars. It is my 
hunch that models based on contest 
success functions and in classical game 
theory are not the most appropriate ones 
to deal with the complexity of 
information in guerrilla wars. However, 
Fearon's model is capable of dealing with 
a crucial issue in irregular wars: the 
dynamics of recruitment for guerrilla 
forces. He found a very elegant way of 
justifying both the long duration of war 
and its low intensity, derived from the 
informational fact that visibility is lethal 
for guerrillas and thus their expansion 
into the cities is too costly to be seriously 
considered.  
 
How and when to transform private 
information into public one is a crucial 
issue in irregular wars. Kalyvas’ (2000) 
theory of the logic of civil wars 
effectively covers the relationship 
between political or organized actors and 
individual civilians, and is one of the first 
explicit theoretical treatments of the 
complex relationships between armed and 
political actors, on one side, and civilians, 
on the other, within a civil war context. In 
those settings civilians have private 
information that is lacking on the side of 
political actors, and the effective 
channeling of that information involves 
denouncing neighbors, using it as a means 
of getting even in feuds going well back 
in time, and even informing on friends 
and relatives if some individual 
advantage, or old offense, is associated to 
it. Note that indvía civilians only act here 
as a source of information for political 
agents. There are some hints as to why 
they would provide information to 
political or armed agents within an 
irregular war. The foremost motive is 
survival, with revenge and personal 
advantage as second motives. However, 
this does not cover the whole spectrum of 
civilians' actions or motives regarding the 
transfer of information in irregular wars. 
As survival becomes the foremost goal of 
civilians within an irregular war, all 
actions that most likely contribute to that 
goal would be chosen and carried out. In 
order to see those expected actions 
materialize civilians and political 
operators use information for their own 
advantage.  
 
Stephen Biddle's point on the distinction 
between communal and ideological wars 
provides a good context to discuss the 
role of information in civil and irregular 
wars.  
 
“Albanian Kosovars, Bosnian Muslims and 
Rwandan Tutsis knew whose side they were on. 
The fight is about group survival, not about the 
superiority of one party's ideology or one side's 
ability to deliver better governance” (Biddle 2006, 
5).  
 
Fair enough, but his argument does not 
capture the dynamics of irregular and 
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civil wars. The fact that Rwandan Tutsis 
knew whose side they were on, and that 
they were readily recognized by foe and 
alike, only covers part of the relevant 
information exchange. For what was 
crucial in Rwanda was not that Tutsis 
were readily recognizable as Tutsis and 
that they themselves knew on whose side 
they were on, but the sudden fall of the 
boundaries separating a vaguely 
perceived annihilation threat - coming out 
of their old foes and friends, the Hutus - 
from the unleash of the real genocide. 
What a theory of war must account for is 
this sudden shift from a vague threat, and 
decades of relative peace, to a full blown 
genocide. Here of course an information 
cascade was set in action on a very short 
notice. After the assassination of 
president Habyarimana, the process of 
coordinated destruction by Hutu mobs 
that ensued ought to be explained by 
means of the social network structure of 
both Hutus and Tutsis, the hierarchical 
structure of their social organizations, and 
the messages effectively and lethally 
broadcasted through those hierarchical 
structures. Ethnic rivalry and conflict 
does not suffice as an explanation.  
 
As Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) point out 
one of the key implications of Biddle’s 
model is the impossibility of defection 
between rival sides. In ethnic wars 
nobody can escape from his ethnic origin 
and label, seems to be its crucial 
statement. But even granting the general 
truth of this implication it is not clear that 
the dynamics of war can be explained by 
the initial ethnic cleavage. In fact 
switching sides is not the only way of 
changing war's outcomes and tipping off 
the balance between parties in civil and 
irregular wars. Events that unleash huge 
waves of collective and coordinated 
violence, along with the network 
structures that make them possible, can 
effectively change the outcome of a civil 
war. My main point is that informational 
processes in irregular wars are far more 
complex than substantive theories of war 
would accept. Ethnic cleavages without 
the "right" network structures and without 
the "right" and sudden shifts in 
boundaries and in coordinated violence 
may remain mild and inoffensive. 
Ideological divisions without the social 
structures and events required for their 
transformation into a war may remain as 
anecdotes easily overcome by political 




Non-expanding information cascades 
 
What is at the root of these huge 
differences in the production of order in 
irregular and conventional wars? My 
hypothesis is that irregular wars, due to 
the decisive role of civilian population 
and social networks structures, do not 
produce, as fast as conventional wars do, 
the information cascades that would lead 
to a final, definite outcome. In 
conventional wars, with unified 
commands, huge political and military 
alliances and active mass media, although 
information flows in both directions---
from the top to the bottom of society, and 
from the bottom to the top---it is pretty 
clear that decisions flow from the top to 
the bottom, through clearly defined 
hierarchical structures, and forcing the 
perception of victory and defeat to flow in 
the same direction.  
 
Both in games theory and in social and 
complex networks traditions there has 
been serious attempts to model how the 
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social interaction of individual agents, 
with private or public information, 
converge to collective action or fall into 
herd behavior [Granovetter 1973, 1978; 
Schelling 1971, 1973, 1978; Hirshleifer et 
al. 1992]. Writing within the recent wave 
of formal work on social learning and 
collective action, Gale and Kariv (2003) 
summarize what standard models of 
sequential social-learning (SSLM) have 
accomplished in this way:  
 
Once the proportion of agents choosing a 
particular action is large enough, the 
public information in favor of this action 
outweighs the private information of any 
single agent. So each subsequent agent 
"ignores" his own signal and “follows the 
herd” (Gale and Kariv Op. Cit., 2).  
 
But as the authors themselves point out 
some of the SSLM assumptions are not 
realistic and impose a very lopsided 
structure on the problem of social 
learning. The first assumption to be 
dropped is the one establishing that all 
actions are public information. This 
assumption is not only unrealistic, it gives 
away the problem at stake: How people 
with only private and local information 
can converge to herd behavior? Assuming 
that all actions are public information 
takes complexity out the situation: if 
everybody knows what everybody is 
doing, it is not surprising that some kind 
of coordinated behavior emerges. The 
second assumption is related to the 
sequential character of the interaction. 
Sequentiality makes coordination easier: 
every agent knows what others have 
chosen in the past and chooses in 
consequence. Gale and Kariv dropped this 
assumption and chose to have agents 
making decisions simultaneously. 
Dropping those two key assumptions was 
bound to have serious theoretical 
implications. To begin with, once agents 
choose simultaneously and on the basis of 
pure local information, some kind of 
social structure is needed to model the 
interaction process and its outcome. A 
natural first choice is social networks. 
That is the authors' choice and the new 
structure they favored to work on is 
labeled as the social network model 
(SNM).  
 
How to link SNM modeling to the 
informational dimension of irregular 
wars? Irregular wars and herd or 
collective behavior have in common the 
social networks structures within which 
they exist. The interactions of civilian 
population, political operators and 
entrepreneurs, and violence specialists 
that make up for irregular wars occur 
within a definite social network 
structures. The crucial question is this: 
How irregular war changes the basic 
properties of the underlying social 
network structure? And in changing them, 
How it will affect the transfer of 
information and the final outcome of war?  
 
In irregular wars local exchanges are 
conducted by different armed agents, in 
interaction with civilians and local 
political factions, within a context prone 
to switching sides and the destruction or 
remaking of political and military 
alliances. This occurs at the same time in 
different regions, villages and 
neighborhoods. The state of war, and its 
perception by civilians and armed agents, 
differs from one region to another, and 
from one village to the next one. How 
probable is, for instance, that an 
information cascade initiated in region  
can expand itself over neighboring 
regions, and even to distant regions? 
Geography, changing alliances, switching 
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sides by civilians and military men, and 
armed agents' divergent preferences over 
geography would tend to stop or break, at 
different moments of time, the 
information cascade initiated in region   
 
Now imagine that all war actions, with a 
positive probability, directly or indirectly, 
change the social network structure. Be it 
changing alliances, or switching sides, or 
geography, or the emergence of 
boundaries, or a combination of all of 
them, or just of a few of them, let us 
assume that all are bound to happen in a 
situation of irregular war. The intuitive 
result is that it is very difficult for an 
information cascade to expand itself to 
neighboring and distant regions for there 
will always be, in any of them actions that 
destroy social networks and create, in 
passing, obstacles or boundaries to flow 
of information. Take, for instance, the 
class of geographical obstacle or 
boundaries. The probability that the 
effects of actions occurring in local 
neighborhoods expand themselves 
towards the whole network is almost nil. 
Geography and loss of connectedness 
operate together keeping the effects of 
war strictly local. In countries like 
Colombia, with a very diverse, changing 
and complex geography, the territorial 
control of armed agents, and its 
capabilities to expand information 
cascades, will change with its geography. 
If, on top of that, the distribution of 
geographical roughness is more or less 
homogeneous, meaning that the 
probability of having a rough terrain 
region neighboring to a flat or mild 
geography region is more or less the same 
all over the country, the complexity of the 
situation grows in consequence (Castillo 
et al. 2007). Please note the strongest 
implication: the fact that is highly 
probable to find rough terrains---prone to 
guerrilla successful activity and survival--
-nearby the largest cities implies that 
information cascades coming out of the 
largest cities do not expand into rural, 
rough spaces, with sparse populations and 
some degree of loyalty to rebel forces. 
The reverse proposition is also true. It is 
not possible that information cascades 
coming from rural areas can expand into 
the cities changing the perceptions of the 
military, the government and the 
citizenry.  
 
Loss of connectedness 
 
Why irregular wars, waged within social 
network structures, do not produce 
definite outcomes and tend to last longer 
than conventional, hierarchical wars? My 
contention is that the impossibility of 
arriving to definite outcomes in irregular 
wars is related to the loss of 
connectedness due to the violent changes 
imposed by warfare on the underlying 
social structure. This condition is 
dependent on the way information is used 
by civilians, military men of both warring 
sides, and political operators and 
entrepreneurs to improve their own 
positions within a context of irregular 
war. It is not an isolated fact or the effect 
of the informational whims of some 
civilian and military agents. As a matter 
of fact, irregular wars, in meshing social 
structure and warfare in a permanent way, 
have created a more difficult and complex 
matter, for it requires the joint 
explanation of the effects of warfare on 
social structure and the impact of social 
networks on warfare, creating in the 
meantime a whole new different puzzle 




Stathis Kalyvas’ work on the logic of 
civil wars is a clear precursor of the 
systematic study of the complex 
interactions between social life and 
irregular warfare. Although his work has 
concentrated itself on the logic of 
violence in civil wars - its intensity and 
means of production - the inner logic it 
has been trying to reveal naturally 
overlaps with the master lines of the 
problem I have been trying to address 
here: How social structure and life, 
restrained by war and survival, determine, 
through multiple paths and ways, the 
levels of violence, the type of warfare and 
the very outcome of war? It is not a 
coincidence that information is at the 
center of his work on civil wars. As 
underlying social structures have an 
impact over war outcomes whereas war 
transforms those social structures, 
understanding this mutual interaction is 
crucial to understand the logic of irregular 
wars and the role of information in their 
development. Stathis Kalyvas’s work on 
the logic of violence in civil wars has 
sharply revealed the relationship between 
information and civilian behavior within 
that context. Quoting Kalyvas at length:  
 
“Selective violence is difficult to 
achieve because it requires 
information---typically private 
information. Private information is 
asymmetrically distributed between 
political actors and individual 
civilians. This is a fundamental 
problem of rule: “The Sovereign can 
punish immediately any fault he 
discovers, but he cannot flatter 
himself into supposing that he sees all 
the faults he should punish”, 
remarked Tocqueville. Although 
some information can be extracted 
violently, there is no substitute for 
consensual provision. However, 
channeling such information to 
political actors often hinges on intra-
community dynamics. These 
dynamics are rarely studied. Indeed, 
the best insights can be found in 
either social anthropology or literary 
works. The most obvious cause of 
this neglect is the difficulty of 
researching or collecting 
systematically data at this level” 
(Kalyvas 2000, 7).  
 
How irregular war contributes to this loss 
of connectedness? There are two main 
sources: armed agents and civilians. Both 
of course mesh and transform each other 
within the social structure emerging from 
war. As armed agents' actions have the 
main objective of controlling civilian 
population, any massacre, assassination, 
threat, and rumor has the effect of 
breaking links between the victims and 
their organizations, and between those 
victims and friends, relatives and 
acquaintances. If the victim is a bridge, a 
middle level operator, or a political 
entrepreneur, the loss of connectedness 
becomes higher. As a matter of fact the 
killing of a top leader may have smaller 
effects, in terms of connectedness lost, 
than the killing or switching of sides of 
middle level operators or bridges. 
Something similar can be said about the 
effects of civilians' actions on 
connectedness. Informing on an enemy, a 
former friend, a not-too-much-liked-
person, a business associate, or a rival 
may have negative effects on the social 
connectedness linked to that person. 
Although the choice of the victim by 
civilians does not depend on his 
importance in the social structure, the 
choice of the victim by organized armed 
agents has a closer relationship to the 
importance of the victim in the social 
structures they are trying to destroy. 
 15
DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 
Working on information obtained from its 
links with civilians, an armed faction may 
order or perform a killing with the clear 
purpose of propitiating the highest 
damage on the enemy's structure and 
connectedness. The damage level depends 
of course on the local situation and on the 
organization's reach. The possibility of 
getting closer to an important operator, 
depends on the social links of the killers, 
and on their ability to mesh with the 
victim's social milieu. In all cases the 
actions of civilians and armed agents in 
an irregular war have, as a not always 
looked for effect, the consequence of 
destroying social connectedness and 
adding more uncertainty to the perception 
of the state of war.  
 
In order to reach definite results in social 
network structures, theoreticians [Gale 
and Kariv 2003, Kearns et al. 2004] have 
assumed that there should be a simple 
path between any pair of agents belonging 
to a network. This is the property of 
connectedness. The lack of connectedness 
has a strong implication: global results are 
not possible anymore. Now imagine a 
situation in which the actions of agents, 
both armed and unarmed, contribute to 
the destruction of social networks. This is 
the situation corresponding to irregular 
wars. Any agent, in any place and time, 
acting on the offensive or on the 
defensive, through rumor, killing, threat 
or betrayal is prone to destroy social links 
and to stop the transfer of information. 
My suggestion is to apply the same logic 
to the issue of irregular wars' duration. 
Here is a proposition that summarizes the 
effects of systematic losses of 




Proposition 1. In irregular wars 
systematic losses in connectedness---due 
to the deleterious effects of irregular war 
on social networks---block information 
transfer and stop information cascades, 
thus preventing irregular wars from 





Let us try to build the simplest model of 
information within a war context. There 
are two rival coalitions, identified by tags 
I  and  J. These coalitions are made up of 
armed and civilian agents. All civilians 
must choose one of the two coalitions. 
They can choose also not to belong to any 
of the two. Trying to stay on a simplicity 
course let us suppose that the only 
information flowing between them is the 
one concerning the state of the war or war 
outcome. That information is only based 
upon what is going on his or her 
neighborhood or location. Nobody enjoys 
global or full information. There are two 
reasons for this. First, there is no process, 
known and available, that allows the most 
informed individual to find the true state 
of war. And if somebody had it, it would 
be most probable that he would be taken 
for an informed fool: most agents would 
not take that process as the true one and 
would not change their beliefs because of 
it. The second reason is just a call from 
realism: we are not linked to everybody, 
but to a limited set of individuals.  
 
Following Gale and Kariv (2003) agents 
are located in neighborhoods represented 
by a finite set of locations indexed by   i = 
1, 2,…, n. . A set of locations {Ni: = 1, 
2,…,n} is a social network represented by 
a family of sets  Each agent  belongs to a 
location connected to other locations by 
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the social network structure, which in turn 
determines how the information about the 
state of war flows within society. But this 
social network structure does not stay the 
same along the war process. The turning 
point of this essay is that all the actions of 
agents within an irregular war do affect 
the social network structure, and thus the 
way in which information about the state 
of the war flows.  
 
Let ω  be the true state of war. Agents 
have private information about the 
outcome of war within their own location, 
but they do not know the true state of war. 
As a matter of fact the true state of war 
depends on the information reached by all 
agents through their own social networks. 
What does it mean that the social network 
changes? It just means that current links 
are severed, decreasing the level of 
connectedness and preventing 
information about the state of war to flow 
throughout the social network. For 
instance, people in location  may be under 
the impression that coalition  is winning 
the war, whereas neighbors in location  
know for sure that coalition  is trumping 
their enemy, and people at location  
unconnected to the other two locations, 
think that the outcome of war is 
indecisive. is it possible to aggregate 
information in that situation? Is it 
possible to converge towards one and just 
one outcome? The model should answer 
negatively all three questions, and 
establish that enough divergence with 
respect to the war outcome is preserved 
via the destruction of social networks 
generated by the war.  
 
Depending on the state of war they 
perceived through their neighborhoods, 
agents decide which action to take in the 
next round. They can either join one 
coalition  or the other – a decision that 
includes leaving the other one.  
 
All agents have private and local 
information about war’s outcomes in their 
neighborhood, and thus they only know 
what their local network let they know 
about the state of war in their own 
location. If war did not affect at all social 
network structures, information would 
pass along a growing social network until 
a common war outcome prevailed. But 






The loss of connectedness thesis is bound 
to face an immediate objection. If the loss 
of connectedness occurs in a lopsided 
way, only destroying the social structures 
and networks related to one of the parties 
to the war, and replacing them by new 
social structures, a natural implication is 
the emergence of a growing advantage for 
that party. It would be only a question of 
time to approach a definite outcome for 
war. Why is that irregular wars do not 
often yield lopsided losses of 
connectedness? Which underlying forces 
contribute to balance out the destruction 
of connectedness all along the space of an 
irregular war? Geography is one the most 
important balancing forces working 
within an irregular war. If geography is 
heterogeneous and the preferences of 
armed agents over territory are also 
heterogeneous, short or medium lived 
information cascades in one region are 
balanced by the emergence of short or 
medium lived information cascades in 
other regions, with a different geography 
and under the control of a rival agent or 
coalition.  
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A besieged coalition in one region of the 
country, counterattacks by showing force 
and strength in a geographically different 
region, probably under the control of 
central state. Beleaguered guerrilla forces, 
attacked in their own sanctuaries by a 
coalition of state army and paramilitary 
troops, would respond either by means of 
spectacular attacks on military 
headquarters or high class places in the 
largest cities of the country, or through 
rapid attacks on state or paramilitary 
forces in places akin to the guerillas' 
geographical preferences. The strategic 
effects of information becomes trickier to 
understand in the first type of actions for 
running against immediate logic the 
central state broadcasts and amplifies the 
importance of guerrilla's responses. 
However there is some logic to this 
seemingly irrational broadcasting of the 
enemy's threat. In purely informational 
terms a central state besieged by smaller 
guerrilla forces must magnify sometimes 
the importance of its enemy’s threat in 
order to mobilize the will and minds of its 
citizens to wage war against the common 
enemy.  
 
Proposition 2. If both sides to an 
irregular war, respond to offensive 
actions of its enemy with actions 
disruptive of the other's social networks, 
and if geography, switching sides, and 
"bridging" operators allow this 
counterattacking actions to happen at any 
space point, thus the probability of a 
lopsided destruction of connectedness is 
very low and war may endure.  
 
As definitive battles, of the Waterloo 
type, are very unlikely to happen in 
contemporary wars, war moves itself into 
the micro world of small actions, 
launched by small forces, with 
informational purposes, and balanced 
destructive effects on social 
connectedness. But balanced destructive 
effects on both sides do not imply damage 
equality. It is not a problem of relative 
forces, military strength or numbers 
superiority. In relative terms rebel forces 
endure heavier losses, both in 
connectedness and troops, but as long as 
they are capable of launching operations 
in other places of the country, recruiting 
new men, and recreating social networks 4 
the balancing property of irregular wars 
still holds.  
 
Offensive actions occur in regions outside 
the core territory of the incumbent armed 
agent. Take for instance paramilitary 
actions in guerrilla protected territories. 
They attack small villages, killing 
selected people, community leaders and 
suspected guerrilla allies. As they 
penetrate deeper into the enemy's territory 
they become weaker and more exposed to 
the enemy's strength. Their advance is 
their demise too: deep into the enemy's 
territory they can fall under its fire power 
and higher territorial knowledge. At the 
end what looked as a very successful 
incursion may become a huge defeat. 
Their strategic expansion, both in 
information and in actions, has strict 
geographical limits: offensive actions in 
                                                 
4 For guerrilla and paramilitary forces, the 
recreation of social networks surpasses all 
ideological or social boundaries. Due to the 
structural difficulty of creating social networks in 
the cities, guerrillas contract out local hoods, 
small violence specialists and even wholesale 
bands to conduct terrorist and offensive 
operations. Paramilitary forces have never 
refrained from recruiting former guerrilla 
members, including middle level commanders, in 





the enemy's core territory are too 
expensive to be taken. So geography and 
strategy mix to stop the expansion of 
order. At the same time, offensive 
reactions from the originally attacked 
incumbent do not occur in the same place. 
It occurs in other places. The final 
outcome is that the original information 
coming out of one party's offensive does 
not expand into neighboring regions and 
spaces. On the contrary offensive actions 
in one territory are balanced out by 
enemy's actions in the attacker's 
territories. Geography allows for a such a 
action-reaction function repeated all over 
the war space.  
 
Why coalitions do not produce definite 
outcomes 
 
A natural setting to model the emergence 
of order in irregular wars is the 
destruction and creation of coalitions of 
agents. A coalition is a grouping of 
agents---armed and civilians---whose 
main objective is to overcome all other 
competing coalitions. If there are only 
two competing coalitions we have a 
classical conflict with two parties fighting 
for victory. As agents move out and in of 
the original coalitions, they change them, 
shifting the balance of power and 
strength, and transforming the global state 
of the war. What distinguishes irregular 
wars from conventional ones is this state 
of permanent change in the numbers and 
composition of coalitions. Whereas in 
conventional wars coalitions tend to be 
stable in time, in its irregular counterparts 
coalitions are always changing, due to the 
shifting decisions of civilians and armed 
agents.  
 
In contradistinction to models of rational 
choice I will consider here all kinds of 
agents---civilian and armed---to the 
conflict, and not only the organized and 
military ones. All agents live in local 
neighborhoods where they interact with a 
small subset of the full set  of agents. Of 
course all agents have different weights 
according to their capacity to make 
credible threats. Agents do not know 
either the global setting within which they 
are interacting, nor the global state of the 
war. Thus they are taking decisions and 
involving themselves in risky action 
without knowing the state of the war in 
other regions, and ignoring the global turn 
of events. Their decisions are myopic in 
this precise sense: they only know what 
they see through their neighbors' actions. 
It is indeed possible that larger 
organizations and social networks yield 
information about the state of the war in 
other neighborhoods and even render 
approximate evaluations of its global 
state. However agents' basic ignorance 
remains the same all along the war. When 
the war's social structure reveals to any 
agent the global state of affairs the war is 
indeed near its closing.  
 
Although advanced for different 
purposes, Arthur De Vany’s treatment of 
the emergence of order within a network 
coalition context is informational in its 
essence and method. Arthur De Vany has 
used effectively the dynamics of 
coalitions to show the emergence of order 
out of agents' spontaneous actions, and 
not out of their reasoning or knowledge. 
In a simulation context he convincingly 
shows that agents locally interacting 
within a network structure, and following 
a probabilistic process with noise, can 
reach global optima and attain order. 
Paradoxically it is noise that allows them 
to search different costly paths to the 
optimal global coalition. All paths, no 
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matter how costly, take agents to the 
optimal coalition. De Vany states his 
main point in this way:  
 
“One of the keys to achieving high 
fitness was the presence of noise. 
Noise promotes discovery and 
learning. Noisy, error-prone 
processes produce extreme outcomes. 
Noisy evolution produces a log 
normal fitness distribution and 
selection drives organizations into the 
extreme upper tail, where power laws 
hold. Selection trims the low 
outcomes and preserves the high 
outcomes. The result is that the 
diversity produced by noisy evolution 
leads through selection to the most fit 
organizations”. (DeVany 1995, 439)  
 
But the evolution of irregular war, of 
course, it is not equivalent to the 
evolution of markets, economic 
organizations, and economic networks. 
No doubt irregular war is an information-
theoretic problem with economic and 
organizational dimensions. And no doubt 
order must emerge out of noise and 
spontaneous interaction. But how does in 
fact noise leads to order in irregular wars? 
Or, to put it in another way, what are the 
implications of the hypothesis that order 
come out of noise in irregular wars? Note 
that this result in fact contradicts my main 
conjecture about the tendency of irregular 
wars to lock-in in an intermediate state 
between disorder and order. A natural 
implication is that in never ending 
irregular wars noise and the making and 
destruction of coalitions do not lead to 
order. Why is so? Why irregular wars 
must end up in stalemate situations if they 
too use noise? Why noise does not lead to 
order in some irregular wars?  
 
Here is an intuitive explanation. The rules 
of the game of irregular wars are 
changing and uncertain. Unlike other type 
of contests in which the end of the game 
is crystal-clear, the end of the game in 
irregular wars is hard to define and spell. 
Let us see it from the point of view of 
coalitions. If a group of agents create a 
very large coalition, short of the universal 
coalition, should the smaller coalition 
considered itself defeated? Should it 
surrender to its larger rival? The answer is 
negative. Holding on to war is still an 
alternative as long as the smaller coalition 
is capable of recruiting new combatants, 
keep territorial control over some regions, 
and survive as an organization. The 
difference with electoral contests is pretty 
obvious. In these contests the set of rules 
stipulate that the largest coalition of all is 
the winner. In irregular wars being 
capable of forming the largest coalition 
short of the universal one is not good 
enough, for if the smaller coalition is still 
capable of some activity and has the will 
to keep on the fight, war will endure. 
Both the will to fight, even in a very 
lopsided situation, and the way in which 
the transfer of information allows the 
weaker side to hold on to war explain 
why creating the largest coalition of all is 
not enough to achieve the end of an 
irregular war. 5  
 
The intuition behind the idea that not 
even forming the largest coalition, just 
short of the universal one, is not enough 
to end an irregular war is this: uncertainty 
                                                 
5 In computational terms, a program with the 
informational properties suggested here for an 
irregular war should face the test of an algorithm 
capable of telling us if that particular program will 
halt after a finite number of steps. The hypothesis 
is that a program with the informational properties 
of an irregular war should not halt in a finite time. 
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with respect to the outcome of war does 
not homogeneously decrease all over the 
space of war. If at least some uncertainty 
remains in some places, and if this 
uncertainty is matched up by the weaker 
coalition's ability to keep some 
recruitment and some minimum level of 




There are at least five different 
informational venues in irregular wars:  
switching sides,  informing on foes, 
friends or former allies,  making bridges 
between rival parties, or between power 
structures and civilians,  creating new 
alliances,  broadcasting rumors or 
perpetrating actions that ignite social 
unrest against a potential enemy. All of 
them create, destroy or change social 
connections, transforming war's 
underlying social structures. By doing 
this they help to achieve crucial features 
of irregular war: the social creation of the 
enemy, the broadcasting of threats---real 
or imagined---, the inception of fear and 
the drive for survival on both sides of the 
developing war. Now I will turn to 
illustrate these information venues and its 
impact on the never ending Colombian 
irregular war. Consider first the role of 
rumours and threats in building up 
Colombian current war and a previous 
episode of violence and irregular war: the 
so-called Violencia.  
 
Rumors and threats 
 
In the Colombian Violencia rumors play a 
key role in determining the levels and 
intensity of violence. The most effective 
ones were originated in the highest 
echelons of politics and organized 
religion. As the conservative party 
consider itself a minority with a gloomy 
electoral future in a country in love with 
elections and its burocratic bounty, their 
leaders decided to trump up an 
imaginative hoax: they said that one 
million and a half of the liberal party's 
members' identity cards were false. For an 
electorate not larger than 4 million 
potential voters, the figure was enormous 
and terrifying. And indeed it terrified 
conservative political operators and 
militants creating the base for a large, 
national-scale onslaught against the 
liberal party members and sympathizers. 
If the conservative party will be denied 
forever electoral victory due to the 
existence of one million and a half false 
identity cards in the hands of its rivals 
there was no other option than launch 
total war against the perpetrators of such 
a horrendous crime against the purity of 
elections. As so they did. With the help of 
local social networks made up of political 
operators, catholic priests, real believers, 
and violent specialists, a war of 
extermination was launched---with 
variations in style, motives, and 
processes---in most regions of the 
country. The myth of the one million and 
a half false identity cards was 
accompanied by smaller myths and 
prejudices: liberals were communist at 
heart, anti-catholic, priest-haters and 
atheists. Laureano Gómez, the foremost 
leader and ideologue of the conservative 
party, coined a monstrous image to 
represent the combination of all fears for 
conservative souls: the Basylischus, a 
mythological monster branding 
communism as his head and the liberal 
party as his body. In a very isolated 
country, under heavy influence of an 
extremely backwards Catholic church, 
Gómez’ creation had a powerful effect.  
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Another piece of effective information at 
La Violencia had to do with the creation 
of a massive military threat in order to 
launch a preemptive campaign of 
annihilation of the supposedly dangerous 
enemy. In the city of Tuluá, in the center 
of the province of Valle del Cauca, 
conservative political operators 
disseminated, within their rank and file, a 
rumour that had the liberal party regional 
chief, Francisco Eladio Ramírez, as the 
organizer of an army of 700 men with 
orders to annihilate the city's conservative 
party members (Alvarez 1988, Molano 
1885). The figure could not but grow in 
conservative militants' minds and fears, 
and with time it rocketed into the 
thousands. This piece of information 
contained its own action: conservative 
political operators and their violence 
specialists launched right away a full 
campaign of terror against liberal party 
members and sympathizers, with total 
killings going rapidly into the hundreds. 
Even knowing how unlikely was that the 
liberal party regional chief had organized 
an army in a few days, they needed the 
rumor and the potential threat it involved 
in order to take action. Expected action 
precedes information but information 
determines the reality of action.  
 
Why did so inept myths and hoaxes work 
out so well in Colombia? Do not forget 
that in the ‘40s and ‘50s Colombia was a 
mostly rural society, isolated from the 
external world, with a limited contact 
with modernity, where the Catholic 
church play a key role as an organizing 
force, a bridge between different social 
classes, and an ideological lighthouse. In 
more technical terms, the Catholic church 
was the best connected organization in the 
whole country, the only one capable of 
reaching most people in any place at any 
time. Most of its members chose to take 
sides in the developing war, losing some 
its connections and concentrating its 
social and ideological influence on the 
conservative side of the political divide. 
Would the electoral and military rumors 
of La Violencia work out today? Not at 
all. Rumors and threats have evolved with 
the war's long duration. They do not 
involve ideology, religion or political 
allegiances anymore. They still may 
involve electoral outcomes, but without 
any relation whatsoever to political, 
ideological or religious allegiances. 
Today's rumors and threats are pragmatic 
and rational, centered around survival, 





The scene has been described by many 
authors (Arteta 2007, Uribe 2004). 
Paramilitary or vigilante troops, 
sometimes state army forces, command 
villagers and peasants to the village's 
main plaza or square. The squad leader 
has a list in his hands. On his side there is 
a hooded man. It is the informer. Names 
are called, villagers respond to their 
names, and the informer gives a "yes" or 
a "no" to a simple question: Has this 
person been a collaborator to the guerrilla 
forces? The informer has the final word in 
deciding the faith of the accused. A “yes” 
is equivalent to a death sentence in the 
hands of paramilitary groups, or a jail 
term in the hands of state forces, a "no" 
means salvation, for now at least. Who is 
the informer? It is of course a person from 
the community, someone with enough 
command upon who is who in the region. 
The most damaging and dramatic turn of 
events involves a former guerrilla 
member who has switched sides and 
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become an informer for his former 
enemy. Or an army officer that becomes a 
guerrilla member or collaborator. In some 
occasions the switching is collective. A 
number of guerrilla combatants and 
collaborators switch sides; the effect is 
devastating for they know all the contacts 
and relations the guerrilla keeps with 
civilians in the regions they have acted in 
the past. Guerrilla militants, collaborators, 
economic providers and sympathizers will 
be the target of retribution and 
annihilation. Selective killings or 
massacres will follow and long-run social 
networks violently disappear in some 
days.  
 
There is huge evidence concerning the 
role of massive switching sides in the 
Colombian war, mostly from guerrilla 
organizations into paramilitary or self-
defense ones. In the north coast, in the 
traditional left-leaning heart of 
Colombia's oil industry, 
Barrancabermerja, and in the Magdalena 
Medio region, a huge chunk of self-
defense' military organizations was made 
up of former guerrilla structures, 
including key middle level commanders.  
 
The fact that middle level operators and 
commanders switch sides is very 
important in understanding the 
transferring of information in the 
Colombian irregular war. On the one 
hand is pretty effective in destroying, in a 
few days, whole social structures and 
networks built up during years of secret, 
patient work, and on the other it increases 
and levels off, for all sides, the social 
learning of military, political, social and 
informational technologies of irregular 
war. Both sides learn from each other 
diminishing the probability of surprise 
and leveling whatever technological 




Burning bridges: traitor types 
 
Informers and traitors and their relatives 
face the deadly risk of retaliation. 
Guerrilla forces execute traitors and 
informers and sometimes reach their 
relatives. The key question here is why 
guerilla, army or paramilitary members 
and sympathizers decide to switch sides 
knowing the high risks involved? An 
irregular war spanning some generations 
must produce individuals whose family 
connections are nil or have lost its 
importance. Due to the war most of those 
individuals' relatives may be living in the 
cities or out of the country or, in some 
cases, they may be dead already. 
Following Schelling's Schelling06 
concept of commitment, or credible 
threats, I suggest that these individuals 
may have already burned down the 
bridges to salvation and family lives. 
They are thus in a post-Schelling's 
commitment state: in any case, be it that 
their families are already safely overseas, 
or that they do not have a family at all, or 
that they just do not care anymore about 
their families' faith, the deadly 
consequences of their actions are 
innocuous to them. They accept the 
perspective of death for themselves and 
do not count into their payoffs or 
expectations whatever can happen to their 
families. This has a very dark global 
implication: if war's evolution create a 
critical number of individuals of this type, 
the perspective of switching sides may 
crystallized all over the spectrum of 
armed agents, propitiating most sources 
of noise, destroying social networks, and 
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making more distant a definite outcome 
for war.  
 
There is another option to be considered: 
individuals become informers or decide to 
switch sides once the power of the new 
dominant armed agent is so 
overwhelming that they do not afraid 
anymore of the incumbents' potential 
retaliations. This, of course, begs the 
process preceding the rise to dominance 
of this new alliance: what was the critical 
mass required for individuals to safely 
switch sides? At some point in time some 
individuals must have faced the risky 
decision of switching or not switching 
sides. At this juncture the effects of 
learning and the burning of bridges must 
have been crucial. An immediate intuition 
is that the rise to dominance of a new 
alliance or coalition should be fast and 
overwhelming, with loyalists to the 
defeated coalition going into hiding or 




Bridges are relationships that link 
otherwise separated or isolated worlds, 
individuals and social structures. In more 
technical terms, bridges are the links that 
fill in the structural holes Burt that isolate 
agents, organizations, firms and even 
armed enemies. What makes them so 
crucial in informational terms is its 
capability to provide non-redundant 
information, for there are no alternative 
venues to communicate the agents or 
worlds at both extremes of the bridge. 
Note that at both ends of the bridge it is 
possible to find one individual or two of 
them. In the first case an individual is 
related to individuals in both 
organizations. He or she is the bridge 
linking the otherwise isolated 
organizations or worlds. In the other case 
at both ends of the bridge it is possible to 
find two different individuals, whose 
relationship allows the two organizations 
to have a permanent channel of 
communication.  
 
What could be the role of bridges in 
irregular wars? Pretty important, 
sometimes even crucial. First, in irregular 
wars the gap between, for instance, the 
rural and urban world, or between 
different ethnic groups, is so large as to 
not having any kind of communication at 
all. Bridges may be the only way of 
knowing what the other side is thinking, 
or of transferring information within 
organization structures situated in 
opposite sides of the war boundary. For 
instance, the state and paramilitary forces 
need to have bridges connecting them to 
rural communities. Sometimes those 
linkages end up being informers whose 
links to the community have been 
severed, or are about to be severed, by 
their own activity. Guerrilla organizations 
are in need of bridges that link its rural 
forces and structures to the forbidden 
cities. Finding, training and keeping 
active those bridges are costly, difficult 
and risky. Each time that individuals 
making those bridges are killed or 
imprisoned, isolation and the loss of a 
long-run work are the costly 
consequences. From the informational 
perspective, informations ceases to flow 
through this channel and the end of war 
becomes more distant.  
 
There is still another type of bridges in 
irregular wars: some individuals, ideally 
unrelated to the sides in war, create for 
themselves such high levels of confidence 
on both rivals (not always equal, of 
course) that they are capable of keeping 
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communication between them at no cost 
to those individuals' lives and prestige. 
They can transfer information, proposals 
and threats from one warring faction to 
the other. How they phrase proposals, 
how they interpret the reception, on both 
sides, of proposals coming from the 
enemy can be instrumental in the success 
or failure of potential negotiations. 
Though is very difficult to appraise their 
real influence in the mutual creation of 
perceptions, it is not difficult to suspect 
that they have a saying in how warring 
parties perceive each other.  
 
Mary Roldán, in her very important book 
on La Violencia in Antioquia, suggests 
the following linkage to explain the 
emergence of violence in that Colombian 
region.  
 
“La Violencia surgió, más que como 
resultado de la muerte de Gaitán, a 
raíz de la intrusión de forasteros---
policías y alcaldes nombrados por los 
municipios por el gobierno central y 
regional en 1949, cuya presencia 
perturbaba las redes del poder local -
ambiciosos de convertirse en 
gamonales” (Roldan 2003, 48). 
 
Roldán is pointing out to the social and 
political linkages that create the required 
social machinery to unleash violence in 
Antioquia. Instead of interpreting 
violence as the result of the master 
cleavage dividing conservative and 
liberal, she tries to reveal the social 
linkages and the kind of political 
operators and violence specialists that 
effectively develop violence in some 
subregions of the Antioquia province. The 
middle level agents of the regional 
government were the political operators 
that effectively used violence to 
consolidate their power in the name of the 
central state. Further on Roldán specifies 
her main thesis:  
 
“Una de las premisas centrales de 
este libro es que la violencia en 
Antioquia estuvo íntimamente ligada 
a las luchas entre los gobiernos 
departamental y central, entre el 
departamento y los habitantes de las 
zonas periféricas por el derecho a 
imponer sus propias prácticas 
políticas, sociales, económicas y 
culturales”. (Ibíd., 49.)  
 
Roldán's thesis links three main factors in 
the development of irregular wars: the 
social network structure, the role of 
political operators and entrepreneurs 
linking the central state and peripherical 
regions, and geography, in the guise of 
the role of peripherical, non-yet-
conquered regions. Note the role of 
political operators and entrepreneurs as an 
effective way of transferring information 
from the center and to the periphery, or of 
blocking that transfer of information and 
initiating new confrontations between the 
regional state power and the aspirations of 




Let us listen to the top ideological leader 
of the Colombian paramilitary, Ernesto 
Báez, explaining why it has been 
impossible to find an end to Colombian 
irregular war. His hypothesis is related to 
the impossibility, shared by all political, 
economic and military agents to tell the 
truth and accept its consequences. He 
found a huge distance between their 
public statements and their real actions. 
Here is Báez's position:  
 
“Mire señor le voy a decir cuál es el 
problema más grave que tiene hoy 
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nuestro país, que es el elemento 
fundamental por la cual la paz va a 
ser muy difícil. Lo peor que tiene esta 
guerra que nosotros libramos y en 
general la vida corriente de nuestra 
nación Colombia, es la mentira, es la 
ausencia de la verdad, aquí miente el 
gobierno nacional, mentimos 
nosotros los paramilitares, miente la 
guerrilla, miente el Ejército, miente la 
Policía, miente la justicia, todos 
mentimos” (Serrano 2007, 155).  
 
This could be an opening point to 
understand how noise does not lead to 
order in irregular wars. If nobody is 
willing to tell the truth and face its 
consequences, it is almost impossible to 
reach a final outcome to war. Báez' 
statement seems reasonable, even truthful 
and deep in its meaning. However, it does 
not inquire into why all agents to the 
Colombian war systematically lie and 
evade truth. From the perspective of 
information, rational agents will tell the 
truth if the payoff coming out of it is 
larger than the ones coming from 
alternative actions - all the shades or 
variations of lying with respect to their 
actions and intentions. My contention is 
that in Colombia coalitions, negotiations, 
military strength, territorial control and 
sheer violence have all failed to put an 
end to the war because a mix of 
information, social structures and 
economic gains have created a situation 
that favors low intensity, irregular war 
over competing alternatives. A quick 
review of some of the peace negotiations 
conducted in Colombia in the last three 
decades can shed light upon my 
statement.  
 
In Colombia the ups and downs of 
irregular war can be traced back to certain 
political events that have changed the 
agents' perceptions of the state of the war 
and consequentially the information upon 
which they were taken decisions. Take for 
instance president Belisario Betancur's 
peace conversations. He tried to develop 
agreements and ceasefires with most of 
the rebel organizations active by 1984. 
The perception for the hegemonic classes 
and its allies in some regions was very 
negative: they saw in the president's 
initiative a way of giving in power to the 
guerrillas and to new alliances between 
rebel forces, leftist politicians, and the 
lower classes. Information did not convey 
a message of peace and tranquility. On 
the contrary it unleashed a very violent 
process of political annihilation and 
genocide, followed by desesperate 
answers from guerrilla organizations as 
the late M-19. What was supposed to be a 
peace initiative and the dawn of a new 
age of peace and development became the 
lethal deepening of war and its expansion 
to new regions of the country.  
 
A similar analysis can be advanced with 
respect to the effects of the peace 
conversations between the government of 
Andrés Pastrana and the Farc. The 
surprising rise of Farc, from a small and 
almost forgotten rural guerrilla, to a major 
political and influential actor rapidly 
accelerated the rhythm of the war and 
propelled the lethal activity of 
paramilitary forces to several regions of 
the country. New, more aggressive and 
effective political alliances between rich 
landowners, cattle growers, drug 
traffickers, traditional and new political 
entrepreneurs and specialists in violence 
(Tilly 2003, Duncan 2006, Romero 2003) 
fueled irregular war to higher levels of 
violence and lethality. By 2001 irregular 
was extended to most of the country and 
the guerrillas, on one side, and the 
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paramilitary and state forces, on the other, 
wage the most intensive war fought so far 
in Colombia. The signal of a sudden surge 
on Farc’s military and territorial power 
was perceived by the hegemonic classes 
and paramilitary forces as a new and 
more decisive threat to their power. From 
the perspective of my informational 
model, one can interpret the peace 
conversations initiated in 1999 as a 
change in the state of information to the 
relevant agents. Farc strategists perceived 
a closer opportunity to reach power and 
the hegemonic classes and its paramilitary 
allies interpreted it as a very dangerous 
threat to its hegemony and acted in 
consequence. As a matter of fact both 
coincided in perceiving a turning point 
looming in the very near future and acted 
in a predictable way. However, and this 
remains to be explained by the model, no 
full and permanent order followed from 
the upsurge in military competition and 
bloody dispute over the control of 
territories and people.  
 
Consider now the following political and 
informational conjecture. The main actors 
of the Colombian war do not have any 
confidence in changing, through 
negotiation, the rules of the game they 
have been playing in. They seem to 
accept the non-written rules of the real 
game they are playing in now, showing 
extreme confidence in their capacity to 
adapt themselves to the changing rules 
introduced by their enemies, but they 
have no confidence at all in openly 
negotiating permanent changes to those 
rules. That is, they have extreme 
confidence in their adaptative powers, but 
a very small, almost nil, confidence in the 
outcomes of negotiation processes that 
involve changing the full set of rules of 
the game.  
This conjecture implies agents' 
preferences for non-agreed, non-binding, 
changing rules over agreed, binding, fixed 
rules. The informational consequences are 
crucial. In the first setting war's end 
depend strictly on the spontaneous 
evolution of war and on its capability to 
produce order out of armed conflict. From 
its multiple local points changing 
information emerges as the rules of the 
game shift according to the evolution of 
war. Coalitions are created and destroyed 
and local powers emerge and disappear. 
In the second setting, with fixed and 
binding rules, all maneuvering should be 
political and bounded by the law. If 
armed agents, of diverse ideological 
perspectives, do no prefer fixed rules is 
natural to infer that they obtain higher 
payoffs, or rewards, from a changing, 
anarchic world than from a more 
structured one. This has another decisive 
implication: agents making higher profits 
from a non-binding situation are those 
with weapons, resources and knowledge. 
In Tilly's language they should be 
violence specialists, political 
entrepreneurs and war time businessmen.  
 
Tilly’s description of the social 
machinery leading to collective violence 
is apt to understand the ways in which 
information changes the actions of agents 
within an irregular war. Here is Tilly’s 
eloquent rendition:  
 
“A rapid move from scattered attacks 
to broken negotiations, for example, 
illustrates a rise in coordination. It 
results from processes in our 
incorporation cluster, notably 
network-based escalation, setting-
based activation, and brokerage. 
Mechanisms of certification and 
upward object shift also regularly 
increase coordination, as outside 
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authorities lend recognition to one or 
more participants in violent 
interactions and as the boundary 
separating antagonists moves from 
local to regional, national, or even 
international divisions. Conversely, 
disruption of connecting networks, 
blocked access to violence-prone 
settings, disappearance of political 
entrepreneurs, severance of ties 
among them, and downward object 
shift (e.g. when local divisions begin 
taking priority over national 
divisions) all reduce levels of 
coordination among participants in 
violent interaction. We have seen a 
devastating version of this downward 
shift as opportunism took over from 
coordinated destruction in Rwanda. 
Changes in uncertainty about 
interactions across established us-
them boundaries exert strong effects 
on switching between violent and 






This essay focused on the logical 
consequences of a simple idea: What if 
the long duration of irregular wars is 
related to the ways and paths through 
which information is transferred between 
armed agents and civilians? In following 
the logical consequences of that 
conjecture I have established three 
working propositions. First, as irregular 
wars are heavily dependent on the control 
of civilian population, the interaction 
between civilians and warriors passes 
through the social networks in which the 
first lived in and the second ones try to 
penetrate and use for their own purpose. 
This simple fact, already perceived by 
other authors, has not been used in its full 
methodological consequences. Social 
networks are information carriers and 
within an irregular war they become the 
preeminent stage in which the real, daily 
battles for dominance are fought.  
 
Second, the main difference between 
hierarchical wars and irregular wars is 
that in the first ones there is no transfer of 
information between warring parties---but 
for the espionage output of its intelligence 
agencies. This means that informational 
complexity is smaller and that sheer 
military power and the will to victory 
define the outcome of war. What makes 
irregular and net wars more complex is 
the fact that allegiance to national states 
does not determine the behavior of 
civilians. As they can switch sides, serve 
as informers and spies, and change 
alliances at any moment, final outcomes 
loom distant in the future. A conclusion 
to be discussed and analyzed in the future 
is this: without clearly defined enemies 
and friends irregular war may endure 
forever. As the enemy has no face, no 
center and no banner, national states will 
be fighting in the dark. The last illusion of 
a clear-cut enemy's face was Hussein's 
statue falling down in pieces to the 
masses joy in Baghdad at the beginning 
of US's invasion. But now that illusion is 
broken and gone and the only memory 
left in the few people that will remember 
those events in the future is the face of a 
man saying some words to his 
executioners before being hanged down.  
 
Third, the systematic loss of 
connectedness and the balancing of one 
side's offensive actions with its enemy's 
actions in different places of the war 
space explain why irregular wars tend to 
endure much more than hierarchical, 
conventional wars. Geography and armed 
agents' heterogeneous preferences for 
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localization, plus a minimum capacity for 
survival and action on the weaker side are 
clearly behind this property. In looking 
for a more general proposition I contend 
that a combination of geography, social 
network structures, and economic gains 
determines that uncertainty with respect 
to the outcome of war does not decrease 
with violent confrontation: never ending 
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